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For many free-market enthusiasts, it is axiomatic that what-
ever government can do, businesses can do better. Especially dur-
ing the 1980s, "privatization" was the watchword for those frus-
trated by the supposed high cost and inefficiency of government-
provided services.' Many states have, in fact, turned to the private
sector to provide such essential public services as garbage pickup2
and prisons.' In California, even the state courts have succumbed
to privatization.
Private judging-or "rent-a-judging"-has expanded over the
past decade in California into a multimillion-dollar industry.4 Un-
like arbitrators or mediators, rent-a-judges are officially part of the
state court system, and their judgments have the same effect as
judgments of any other state court. Superficially, a rent-a-judge
differs from his public court colleagues in only one respect: the
source of his paycheck.5
1. For a sampling of recent, enthusiastic analyses of the virtues of privatization, see
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND THE PRIVATIZING OF GOVERNMENT (Calvin A. Kent ed., 1987);
RANDALL FITZGERALD, WHEN GOVERNMENT GOES PRIVATE (1988); REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON PRIVATIZATION, PRIVATIZATION: TOWARD MORE EFFEc-
TIVE GOVERNMENT (1988).
2. Calvin A. Kent & Sandra P. Wooten, Privatization: The Entrepreneurial Response,
in ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND THE PRIVATIZING OF GOVERNMENT, supra note 1, at 145,
152.
3. Id. at 154-55; Robert P. Weiss, Private Prisons and the State, in PRIVATIZING
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 24, 30-31 (Roger Matthews ed., 1989).
4. At least three companies provide rent-a-judge services in California: Judicial
Arbitration & Mediation Services Inc. (JAMS), based in Orange; the Philadelphia-based
Judicate, which has offices in California; and the San Francisco-based Judicial Resources
Inc. Mark Thompson, Rented Justice, CAL. LAW., March 1988, at 42, 43. Gross revenues
for JAMS, the biggest of these companies, had been projected to reach approximately
$24 million in 1991-1992 (including fees from arbitration and mediation as well as rent-a-
judge services). Jean Guccione, Selling Justice, CAL. LAW., Oct. 1991, at 32, 36.
5. Details about the rent-a-judge system are discussed infra Part 1.
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From its beginning, rent-a-judging has prompted worries about
the propriety of privatized justice. Despite its touted efficiency, the
rent-a-judge system is marred by constitutional and policy con-
cerns. Opponents have especially decried the creation of a two-
tiered system of justice-one for the wealthy and one for the
poor. Rent-a-judge justice, though speedy, is also quite expensive.
The most popular, and presumably the best, rent-a-judges com-
mand $5,000 a day.6 Consequently, only the wealthiest litigants
can afford a rent-a-judge-a result that is not only inequitable but
quite possibly unconstitutional under California law.7
The rent-a-judge system also has raised a number of practical
considerations. Critics have condemned the secrecy of rent-a-judge
proceedings and the lack of disclosure requirements or other regu-
lations to govern the behavior of rent-a-judges and ensure their
impartiality.8 Moreover, the California courts have yet to unravel
the numerous procedural implications of rent-a-judge practice. For
example, the preclusive effect of a rent-a-judge's judgment still is
untested, as is its authority as precedent.' Also unclear is the
scope of a rent-a-judge's powers. Despite some limitations, rent-a-
judges appear to have broad powers, and the line between private
and public judges seems fuzzy at best. Particularly disturbing is the
apparent power of rent-a-judges to call juries.'0
6. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
7. For a discussion of the constitutional argument, see infra Part II.
8. In February 1993, in response to some of these criticisms, the Judicial Council of
California approved a set of rules to govern cases tried by privately compensated judges.
CAL. R. CT. 244(d) (regulating use of public facilities by temporary judges); CAL. R. Cr.
532.1(c) (regulating use of public facilities by general referees). These rules were the first
attempt to regulate rent-a-judges,' and their approval came after nearly four years of de-
bate. Tom Dresslar, Rules on Private Judging Guard Access, Disclosure, Los ANGELES
DAILY J., Mar. 5, 1993, at A5. Although the new rules may placate some critics, they do
nothing to address many serious policy issues. Details and policy implications are dis-
cussed infra Part III.
9. See infra text accompanying note 186.
10. See infra notes 38-46 and accompanying text. All these concerns are also becom-
ing more urgent as more states adopt the use of private judges. In 1992, the rent-a-judge
system expanded to New York, where JAMS and Endispute, two alternative dispute reso-
lution (ADR) service companies, opened offices on Park Avenue. Marcia Chambers, A
Private System Has Emerged That Will See Cases Drawn Into an Unseen World, NAT'L
LJ., June 15, 1992, at 15. For an analysis of the New York statute authorizing private
judging, see David J. Shapiro, Note, Private Judging in the State of New York: A Critical
Introduction, 23 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 275 (1990). Ten other states also have
statutes that permit proceedings similar to the rent-a-judge proceedings authorized in
California. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-253 (1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1151
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This Note expands on all these concerns and concludes that
the rent-a-judge system is both undesirable as a matter of public
policy and unconstitutional under California law. Part I surveys
the history and statutory bases of the rent-a-judge system and
examines its practice in California today. This Part also considers
the business aspects of private judging. Part II details the argu-
ment that the rent-a-judge system violates the due process and
equal protection clauses of the California Constitution. Finally,
Part III analyzes the policy debate over private judging. Specifical-
ly, this Part addresses the larger question of whether privatized
justice is desirable as a matter of public policy. Concededly, what
can be called private justice already exists in the guises of arbitra-
tion and mediation. Arbitration and mediation, however, are whol-
ly private forms of dispute resolution, and this Note argues that
the rent-a-judge system is an intolerable fusion of the public and
private sectors. Rent-a-judges have broad authority to marshal the
power of the state, which raises troubling questions about the
extent to which private parties should be able to co-opt such au-
thority.
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND, HISTORY, AND CURRENT PRACTICE
A. Statutory Procedures
California law authorizes two types of private trials: trials
conducted by a temporary judge1 and trials conducted by a ref-
eree.'" Both temporary judges and referees may serve as rent-a-
judges. Temporary judges differ from referees in the scope of their
powers and in their qualifications. In general, temporary judges
are closer to the "real thing" than are referees. Both proceedings,
however, require the consent of all parties, and the parties are
free to choose their judge.
(West 1964); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 515.010-.230 (Vernon 1949); NEB. REV. STAT. §§
25-1129 to -1137 (1989); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 519:9 (1974); N.C. R. Civ. P. 53;
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 612-615 (West 1988); S.C. R. Civ. P. 53; TEX. CIV. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. §§ 151.001-.013 (West 1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
4A8.010-.130 (West 1988). All of these statutes date from the late 1800s, except for the
Texas statute, which was enacted in 1987. For an analysis of private judging in Texas,
see W. Frank Newton & David G. Swenson, Adjudication by Privately Compensated
Judges in Texas, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 813 (1984).
11. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 21.
12. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 638-645 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994).
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1. Appointment of a Rent-a-Judge and Procedures for Tri-
al. As noted, rent-a-judges come in two varieties: temporary
judges and referees. The California Constitution authorizes the
appointment of temporary judges. Under article VI, section 21,
"[o]n stipulation of the parties litigant the court may order a cause
to be tried by a temporary judge who is a member of the State
Bar, sworn and empowered to act until final determination of the
cause."' 3 Although private parties can choose to use a temporary
judge for a private trial, most temporary judges now in service
have been appointed and paid for by the state to help take up the
slack in regular state courts. In fiscal 1987-1988, temporary judges
served more than 3,100 days in the California superior courts. 4
Most privately paid judges are instead referees, who are au-
thorized to serve under California's reference statutes. California
law authorizes two types of reference proceedings: "special" refer-
ences and "general" references.' Rent-a-judges perform the lat-
ter. Special references are usually ordered by the court, and the
consent of the parties is not required. 6 In these proceedings, the
referee decides specific questions of fact and reports his findings
to the trial judge. 7 The special referee's findings are advisory
and are not binding as judgments in and of themselves. 8 On the
other hand, in a general reference, which rent-a-judge proceedings
almost always are, all parties must consent, 9 and the chosen ref-
eree decides all issues of fact and law.2° Moreover, the referee's
decision stands as the judgment of the court.2 The primary stat-
13. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 21.
14. 2 JUDICIAL .COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 1989 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE REPORT
146 (1989) (Table T-71).
15. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE §§ 638-645 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994).
16. Id. § 639.
17. Id. §§ 639, 643.
18. Ellsworth v. Ellsworth, 269 P.2d 3, 5 (Cal. 1954) (en banc).
19. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 638; see Holt v. Kelly, 574 P.2d 441, 442 (Cal. 1978)
(en banc).
20. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 638.
21. The California statute provides that
[t]he decision of the referee or commissioner upon the whole issue must stand
as the decision of the court, and upon filing of the statement of decision with
the clerk of the court, or with the judge where there is no clerk, judgment may





ute authorizing general reference proceedings is section 638 of the
California Code of Civil Procedure.' This statute does not con-
tain provisions requiring referees to meet specific qualifications,'
and unlike temporary judges, referees presumably do not even
need to be lawyers.24
Once the parties have chosen a judge, they request the trial
court to issue an order of reference or an order of appointment
(in the case of a temporary judge) authorizing the rent-a-judge to
hear the case. This order may also contain stipulations delineating
the scope of the rent-a-judge's authority. For example, the litigants
can agree to change or abandon formal rules of pleading, evi-
dence, or procedure.' Otherwise, the usual court rules apply.26
The agreement may also contain provisions concerning payment of
the rent-a-judge. Parties usually split the costs evenly.' Once the
court issues its order of reference or its order appointing a tempo-
rary judge, the parties are free to determine when and where the
trial will take place; California statutes impose no restrictions on
these details.2"
After the trial, if the rent-a-judge was a temporary judge,
judgment is entered with the court just as if an active judge has
been presiding. If the trial was a general reference, the rent-a-
judge referee must file a statement of decision with the court
within twenty days.29 In either case, the rent-a-judge's reports
must contain both findings of fact and conclusions of law. 0 Be-
cause their judgments are equivalent to the judgments of any state
22. The statute provides as follows:
A reference may be ordered upon the agreement of the parties filed with
the clerk, or judge, or entered in the minutes or in the docket:
1. To try any or all of the issues in an action or proceeding, whether of fact or
of law, and to report a statement of decision thereon;
2. To ascertain a fact necessary to enable the court to determine an action or
proceeding.
Id. § 638.
23. See id. §§ 638-645.
24. Litigants invariably choose retired state judges, however, because they want a
competent legal determination of their case. Barlow F. Christensen, Privdte Justice:
California's General Reference Procedure, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 79, 81.
25. Richard Chemick, The Rent-a-Judge Option, Los ANGELES LAW., Oct. 1989, at
18, 20.
26. Id.
27. Christensen, supra note 24, at 82.
28. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 638-645.
29. Id. § 643; see In re Marriage of Demblewski, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 533, 535 (1994).
30. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 643.
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court 3 -and therefore are appealable-rent-a-judges must follow
substantive law in making their decisions. The right of appeal is
the primary difference between rent-a-judges and arbitrators or
mediators.32 By reserving the right to appeal, the rent-a-judge
system therefore provides parties the speed of arbitration without
the risks.33
2. The Powers of a Rent-a-Judge. The full extent of a rent-
a-judge's powers are not clear, although numerous cases hold that
private judges have the power to conduct trials the same way
public judges do.34 A rent-a-judge's powers depend on whether
he was appointed as a temporary judge or as a referee. Tempo-
rary judges indisputably enjoy more authority than do referees.
With a few major limitations, temporary judges wield the same
panoply of powers as active judges. Most significantly, temporary
31. Id. § 644.
32. Under California law, a court will not vacate an arbitration award absent corrup-
tion, fraud, or prejudicial misconduct on the part of the arbitrator. CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 1286.2 (West Supp. 1994). The Federal Arbitration Act also has stringent stan-
dards on review. The text of the Federal Arbitration Act is substantially similar to the
California statute and permits a court to vacate an arbitration award only upon a show-
ing of corruption, fraud, impermissible partiality, or prejudicial misconduct. 9 U.S.C. § 10
(Supp. IV 1992).
33. Few parties, however, seem to take advantage of their right to appeal. A search
on Westlaw turned up only about half a dozen cases in which parties appealed rent-a-
judge judgments. Search of Westlaw, CA-CS database (Sept. 24, 1994); see In re Marriage
of Demblewski, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 533 (1994); Salka v. Dean Homes of Beverly Hills, Inc.,
22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 902 (1993); Turner v. Architectural Design Group, 262 Cal. Rptr. 375
(Ct. App.), review denied, ordered not officially published (Nov. 30, 1989); Four
Embarcadero Ctr. Venture v. Mr. Greenjeans Galleria Corp., 250 Cal. Rptr. 325 (Ct.
App.), review denied, ordered not officially published (Oct. 27, 1988); North Coast Village,
Ltd. v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 26 (Ct. App.), review denied, ordered not officially
published (Mar. 28, 1985). The majority of these cases were denied review by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, which, interestingly, ordered the appellate court decisions to be
"depublished" and therefore not binding as precedent.
Private judge Lester Olson theorizes that few parties appeal because
[t]he same economic and pragmatic reasons that compel a decision to use the
private procedure for the trial continue to exist. A speedy trial and resolution
of the dispute is needed. Finality after the trial is still a very important consid-
eration. Second, the judicial selection process, by which all parties must fully
agree on the particular judge to try the case, guarantees a high degree of confi-
dence in the judge selected for the case.
Lester E. Olson, Pick Your Own Judge: An Insider's Look at the California Rent-a-Judge
System, COMPLEAT LAW., Winter 1987, at 38, 40.
34. See, e.g., Clark v. Rancho Santa Fe Ass'n, 265 Cal. Rptr. 41, 51 (1989); Ellsworth
v. Ellsworth, 269 P.2d 3, 3 (Cal. 1954); In re Bums' Estate, 2 Cof. 39 (1888); Plant v.
Fleming, 20 Cal. 93 (1862).
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judges can punish for contempt,35 although their contempt power
may be imposed only upon stipulation by a "party litigant. 3 6  In
contrast, referees cannot punish anyone for contempt.3 7 This is
less of a handicap than it appears. Because the parties before a
rent-a-judge have consented to this forum, it is unlikely that a
rent-a-judge will have to coerce any party into doing anything.
All rent-a-judges also have the power to call in juries, which
one commentator has condemned as "a form of involuntary servi-
tude."38  Defenders of "rent-a-juries,"39  however, claim that as
far as the jurors are concerned, "it's the same function no matter
who is presiding."4 One article cites several instances in which
litigants used rent-a-juries as well as rent-a-judges.4' According to
this article, the jurors never knew they were taking part in private
trials.42 One such trial took place in an empty room of the traffic
court building,43 and the parties chose the jurors from the county
court's jury pool.' The public courts do not seem to mind this
incursion into their territory. Judges in the Los Angeles and Or-
ange County superior courts apparently have agreed to provide
35. See Sarracino v. Superior Court, 529 P.2d 53, 60 (Cal. 1974).
36. Id.; see also In re Plotkin, 127 Cal. Rptr. 190, 192 (Ct. App. 1976); Nierenberg v.
Superior Court, 130 Cal. Rptr. 847 (Ct. App. 1976). However, a temporary judge cannot
compel a third-party witness to testify in court. See David B. Stern, Rent-a-Judge or Rent-
a-Wimp, Los ANGELES LAW., Oct. 1991, at 40.
37. Marcus v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 111 Cal. Rptr. 101, 105 (Ct.
App. 1973). This case held broadly that no "subordinate officer, court commissioner or
referee" can hold someone in contempt. Id. at 104. This case seems to imply that a
referee may cite someone for contempt but cannot enforce the contempt citation. Instead,
enforcement must come from the court that ordered the reference. Id. at 103-04.
38. Mark Thompson, Why not Rent a Jury, Too?, CAL. LAW., Mar. 1988, at 45
(quoting Robert Gnaizda, an attorney with a public interest firm in San Francisco).
39. Id. Jurors in rent-a-judge proceedings are not actually "rented" but are called
through the usual process for summoning juries. The term "rent-a-jury" is used to dis-
tinguish juries serving in rent-a-judge proceedings from those serving in regular public
court proceedings.
40. Id. (quoting H. Warren Knight of JAMS).
41. Id.
42. Id. The article quotes the judge who presided over one such trial, Charles
Woodmansee: "So far as I'm aware, no one made a point of telling [the jurors what was
going on]." Id.
43. Id
44. Id. One detail the article does not make clear is whether the private judge in
this case was a temporary judge or a referee. Temporary judges appointed and paid by
the state to work in the regular courts have long presided over jury trials. Thus, it is not
anomalous for a privately paid temporary judge to preside over a jury. No cases, howev-
er, have directly established the power of referees to use juries.
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both jury panels and vacant courtrooms.' However, the Judicial
Council of California has recently promulgated rules on rent-a-
judge practice that attempt to limit these arrangements. One of
these rules prevents the use of public courtrooms and resources
for private trials without the consent of a presiding judge.4 6 This
prohibition leaves open the possibility, however, that rent-a-judges
can call juries through alternate means. There is also the possibili-
ty that presiding judges will simply rubber-stamp requests to use
public courtrooms and to call jurors.
Another issue is when the power of a private judge ends. For
temporary judges, the same rules that govern active judges ap-
ply.47 The temporary judge has the power to hear post-trial mo-
tions such as a motion for new trial or a motion to tax costs.48
Some commentators believe that the post-trial powers of referees
may be more limited because their authority ends once they file
their statement of decision with the court.49 The California Court
of Appeal has held, however, that referees do have the power to
hear a motion for new trial.5"
B. The History of Rent-a-Judges in California and a Look at Cur-
rent Rent-a-Judge Practice
The statutory authority for rent-a-judge proceedings has exist-
ed for decades. The California general reference statute dates back
to 1872," and the constitutional provision authorizing temporary
judges was enacted in 1966.2 It was not until the late 1970s,
however, that rent-a-judges became popular. In 1976, three Los
Angeles lawyers53 dreamed up the idea of using a general referee
to handle a complex commercial case.54 Then in 1979, H. Warren
45. Id.
46. CAL. R. Cr. 244(d), 532(d) (regulating use of public facilities by temporary judg-
es); id. 244.1(c), 532.1(c) (regulating use of public facilities by general referees). These
rules became effective July 1, 1993.
47. Chernick, supra note 25, at 19.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 22-23.
50. Clark v. Rancho Santa Fe Ass'n, 265 Cal. Rptr. 41, 52 (Ct. App. 1989).
51. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 638 historical note (West 1993).
52. CAL. CONsT. art. VI, § 21.
53. The lawyers were Hillel Chodos, James H. Craig, and Seth M. Hufstedler. See




Knight, an Orange County Superior Court judge, retired from the
bench to found Judicial Arbitration & Mediation Services (JAMS),
the first rent-a-judge company and now the nation's largest provid-
er of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) services." Today, at
least three companies provide rent-a-judges, 6 and many more
judges work on a free-lance basis.5 7
1. Rent-a-Judges' Customers. According to some sources,
rent-a-judges are most popular in two types of cases: complex
commercial litigation and divorces.5 One source found that half
of the cases referred to rent-a-judges in Los Angeles were divorc-
es." Litigants in complex commercial disputes might prefer rent-
a-judge proceedings for several reasons besides their speed. For
example, parties may choose a private judge because of his spe-
cialized knowledge in a given area.6' A primary advantage of
using rent-a-judges in family disputes is the relative privacy of the
proceedings.61 Because litigants generally split the costs, rent-a-
judges rarely hear cases involving impecunious plaintiffs and cor-
porate defendants.
Private parties are not the only ones opting for rent-a-judges,
however. Some state agencies also are taking their litigation pri-
vate. For example, the University of California at San Francisco
agreed to use a rent-a-judge in settling a dispute with a neighbor-
55. Nicholas Varchaver, Dispute Revolution, AM. LAW., Apr. 1992, at 60, 62. This
article provides a good comprehensive history of JAMS.
56. See supra note 4.
57. In Los Angeles County alone, more than 60 retired judges hire themselves out
on a free-lance basis. Olson, supra note 33, at 39. The 1994 Directory of California Law-
yers lists 393 retired judges available for private dispute resolution.
58. Gail D. Cox, The Best Judges Money Can Buy, NAT'L LJ., Dec. 21, 1987, at 1,
23; Olson, supra note 33, at 39. Cox quotes rent-a-judge Jerry Pacht as saying that enter-
tainment law disputes are also good candidates for rent-a-judging. Cox, supra, at 23. For
example, Pacht handled a case involving a dispute over the cassette distribution rights of
the movie Rambo. Id.
59. Cox, supra note 58, at 23. Celebrities who have resorted to rent-a-judges for
their divorce proceedings include sportscar maker John DeLorean and talk-show host
Johnny Carson. FITZGERALD, supra note 1, at 97.
60. Thompson, supra note 4, at 44-45. John J. Welsh, general counsel of JAMS,
notes that many judges have built reputations as specialists in areas such as construction
disputes. Telephone Interview with John J. Welsh, General Counsel, JAMS (Oct. 15,
1993).
61. Although rent-a-judge proceedings are nominally open to the public, see infra
text accompanying notes 202-07, they do not tend to be held in courthouses or in public
buildings and are thus far less accessible to the public. Chernick, supra note 25, at 18.
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hood association that wanted to stop construction of a new phar-
macy school. 2 In another case, the State Air Resources Board
turned to a private judge to settle a pollution dispute with a pri-
vate oil and gas company.63 State agencies' reliance on rent-a-
judges troubles those who believe that private judges should not
be deciding matters of public policy.'
2. The Rent-a-Judge Business. Rent-a-judge practice is big
business. Over the past decade, the number of retired judges for
hire has increased exponentially. JAMS, for example, started out
in 1979 with a single retired judge.65 In 1993, JAMS had 230 re-
tired judges working out of fourteen offices in three states.6
JAMS judges handle about 13,000 cases a year. 7 Most of these
involve arbitration and mediation, but a fair number, especially in
Orange County, involve referee proceedings. 8
Revenues for JAMS and other ADR companies have grown
as quickly as the number of judges for hire. In fiscal 1987-1988,
gross annual revenues for JAMS totaled about $2.7 million.69 In
fiscal 1991-1992, revenues had been expected to reach $24 mil-
lion.7" A rival company, Judicate, has boasted a similar increase
in profits: gross annual revenues climbed from $1.8 million in
fiscal 1990 to a projected $6.5 million in 1991.7' Rent-a-judges
generally cost between $300 to $500 an hour, though some popu-
lar judges command per diem fees of up to $5,000.72 Although
JAMS officials interviewed declined to disclose the average earn-
ings of a JAMS judge, General Counsel John Welsh acknowledged
62. Steven Pressman, Public Issues and Private Judges, CAL. LAW., Nov. 1990, at 17
(citing Laurel Heights Improvement Ass'n v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., S.F. Super.
Ct. No. 862850 (1989) (unpublished disposition)).
63. Cox, supra note 58, at 24. The state lost in the rent-a-judge trial but later won
in the California Supreme Court. Western Oil & Gas v. State Air Resources Bd., 691
P.2d 606 (Cal. 1984).
64. For further discussion, see infra Part III.
65. Guccione, supra note 4, at 32.
66. Telephone Interview with John J. Welsh, General Counsel, JAMS, supra note 60.
67. Id.
68. See infra text accompanying notes 94-96.
69. Guccione, supra note 4, at 36.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Telephone Interview with John J. Welsh, General Counsel, JAMS, supra note 60.
Welsh stated that these figures apply not only to JAMS judges, but also to free-lance
judges and judges from other ADR companies. Id.
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that the typical retired judge can earn far more as a rent-a-judge
than he earned while on the bench. One source speculates that
JAMS judges typically work sixty to seventy hours a month and
take home about $120,000 a year.73 In contrast, in 1992, full-time
judges on the California Superior Courts earned $99,297 a year.74
In addition, retired judges older than sixty who served twenty
years on the bench receive pensions equaling 75% of their full-
time salaries.' State retirement benefits also include health insur-
ance.
76
One of the early fears of critics was that the rent-a-judge
practice would cause a "brain drain., 77 Lured by big profits, judg-
es presumably would leave the bench in droves. However, several
sources indicate that massive early retirements have not occurred,
perhaps because state judges must stay on the bench for twenty
years to qualify for maximum retirement benefits.78 One recent
survey of retired judges found that money-making opportunities as
rent-a-judges or as arbitrators and mediators ranked below other
reasons for retiring, such as "desire for rest and relaxation, and
dissatisfaction with service in the public justice system. '' 79 Money
is definitely on the mind of many retirees, however. In the same
survey, 35% of retirees listed opportunities in ADR as one of the
top three reasons for leaving the bench." When Judge Lester E.
Olson retired from the bench several years ago, the announcement
for his retirement party, reprinted in California Lawyer, depicted
the judge skiing down a slope and making a giant dollar sign in
the snow. 81 The announcement read:




77. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
JUDICIAL COUNCIL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PRIVATE JUDGES 17 (1990) [hereinafter
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS].
78. See, e.g., id. (citing the California Judicial Retirement Study (National Center for
State Courts, 1988), which found that less than a third of the 64 rent-a-judges surveyed
had retired early); JANICE A. ROEHL ET AL., INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL ANALYSIS, PRIVATE
JUDGING: A STUDY OF ITS VOLUME, NATURE, AND IMPACT ON STATE COURTS, 13
(1993); Don J. DeBenedictis, Study OKs Rent-a-Judge, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1990, at 41.
79. RoEHL ET AL., supra note 78, at 13.
80. Id.
81. Thompson, supra note 4, at 44.
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In about 1,224 hours, 17 minutes and 40 seconds, LES [Olson]
will retire from the formal life of a sitting Judge and, with com-
puter in hand, slide rather comfortably into the posh and cushy
role of private Judge (retired) with trailing calendar and pre-
printed bills (medium three-figure range) for services to be ren-
dered; Join us in wishing LES all the best and much $u¢¢e$$.'
Although judges may not be retiring early, the consensus is
that judges are retiring as soon as they can.83 As Judge Olson
himself said, "[Flew judges have remained in active service after
the required 20 years of service. Some judges, of course, return to
the practice of law. Some retire to trim roses or take world cruis-
es. But many become rent-a-judges."'  Although the retirement of
judges may not be causing a shortage on the active bench, some
say that fewer retired judges are available for emergency court-
house assignments."
Judging for profit also has produced other interesting side
effects. Judges who once made their living intimidating lawyers
now must go about courting them, and some judges report a
marked change in their courtroom demeanor. One such judge,
Jack Tenner, had a tough reputation on the bench but reportedly
calmed down once he entered the private judge market. 6 He ad-
mitted that "[s]ome miserable son-of-a-bitch on the bench becomes
the nicest guy in the world when he becomes a private judge."'
Another reported side effect is what some would call the
natural result of working by the hour. One attorney reported to
82. Id. Olson is today one of the most sought-after rent-a-judges in the state. Id. at
43. Outside California, the most famous rent-a-judge of them all may be Joseph Wapner
of television's The People's Court. Cox, supra note 58, at 23.
83. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 77, at 18; DeBenedictis, supra note
78, at 41.
84. Olson, supra note 33, at 39.
85. Cox, supra note 58, at 23. Cox quotes William E. Davis, director of the Adminis-
trative Office of the Courts, as saying that the pool of retired judges has "shrunk signifi-
cantly." Id.
86. Guccione, supra note 4, at 35.
87. Id. Some judges, on the other hand, try to capitalize on their tough reputations.
When Judge Ira Brown joined JAMS, the company ran an ad showing two open-
mouthed sharks with the caption "Just when you thought it was safe to come to
JAMS ... ." Id. Although some would argue that turning judges into nicer human be-
ings is a beneficial side effect of rent-a-judging, judges' changing their personalities to suit
their customers and sell their services raises disturbing implications about judicial impar-
tiality. Those with great faith in the corrective powers of the free market, however,
would argue that bias would in fact be eliminated, not encouraged.
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the National Law Journal about a rent-a-judge who spent nineteen
days hearing oral arguments for an injunction.8 "I couldn't even
get him to take judicial notice that L.A. has smog," the attorney
said.89 The total bill: $80,000. 9° Such behavior should obviously
be very rare, because the goal of each rent-a-judge is to attract
repeat business. What is troublesome, however, is that judges are
modifying their behavior to attract and keep business. Defenders
argue that judges behave more fairly in rent-a-judge proceedings
than in standard proceedings because a reputation for partiality
can quickly derail a blossoming practice. There may be situations,
however, in which a rent-a-judge presides over a trial involving a
repeat customer on one side and a first-timer on the other; such a
rent-a-judge would certainly face more temptation toward bias.9"
Moreover, this type of bias would be encouraged, not discouraged,
by market forces because the goal of a rent-a-judge is to attract
and keep repeat players who can provide a steady income. The
market provides rent-a-judges with no incentive to accord equal
favor to one-time customers.92
3. The Volume of Rent-a-Judge Proceedings. The number of
rent-a-judge proceedings is very small compared to the total num-
ber of cases filed in the California state courts. Although the total
numbers of references and private temporary judge proceedings
are unavailable,93 it may be possible to extrapolate a rough total
from figures given by practitioners. According to Sheri Stoyanoff,
operations manager for the JAMS Orange County Regional Office,
JAMS judges in Orange County handle approximately twenty
proceedings a month as referees or private temporary judges.94
88. Cox, supra note 58, at 23.
89. Id. (quoting attorney Joel S. Moskowitz).
90. Id.
91. The Judicial Council of California has taken a first step toward remedying this
difficulty by promulgating new rules requiring rent-a-judges to disclose prior employment.
See CAL. R. CT. 244(c), 532(c) (applying to temporary judges); id. 244.1(b), 532.1(b) (ap-
plying to referees).
92. It would be fallacious to assume that both sides in a dispute always are equally
sophisticated and either know or have the resources to discover a particular rent-a-judge's
"track record."
93. California's Administrative Office of the Courts does not keep track of privately
judged cases. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 77, at 23. The report laments
the lack of data on the number of rent-a-judge cases and the types of disputes involved.
The Judicial Council Advisory Committee on Private Judges recommended that the Judi-
cial Council of California conduct a comprehensive study to gather this data. Id.
94. Telephone Interview with Sheri Stoyanoff, Operating Manager, JAMS (Oct. 20,
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Stoyanoff said, however, that the bulk of the reference proceedings
involve only discovery matters." In such proceedings, the rent-a-
judge handles all pre-trial and discovery motions; the public court
handles the actual trial. The Orange County JAMS office handles
only about two full-blown private trials a month.96 In total, JAMS
handles 240 reference proceedings a year in Orange County, and
perhaps only about two dozen of these are complete trials. Com-
pare these figures with a total of 53,929 civil filings in Orange
County in fiscal 1991-1992, and the total number of rent-a-judge
proceedings handled by JAMS appears miniscule.97 One commen-
tator estimates that private judges handled only 0.089 percent of
all civil trial dispositions statewide in 1988.98 Another study pub-
lished in March 1993 by the Institute for Social Analysis estimated
the number of private trials in 1991 at only between 200 and 300
statewide. 99
Defenders of the rent-a-judge system may point to its infre-
quent use as proof that private judges have not damaged the pub-
lic court system. In fact, they say, it has made no difference at all.
The current surge in the use of rent-a-judges is still a recent phe-
nomenon, however, and the fact that relatively few people use
1993). JAMS is used as an example for this purpose because it controls approximately
60% of the ADR market in California. Telephone Interview with John J. Welsh, General
Counsel, JAMS, supra note 60.
95. Telephone Interview with Sherri Stoyanoff, supra note 94.
96. Id.
97. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, ANNUAL DATA REFERENCE, 1991-92 CASE-
LOAD DATA BY INDIVIDUAL COURTS 13-26 (1992). These figures include filings in pro-
bate and family courts as well as single-party petitions.
98. Richard Chernick, What's Wrong with Private Judging, Los ANGELES LAw., Nov.
1989, at 19, 20. In fiscal 1991-1992, there were 703,791 civil cases filed in the superior
courts. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, VOL. II: ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE CALIFORNIA COURTS, Superior Court
Table 6. Again, this figure includes filings in probate and family courts as well as single-
party petitions.
99. ROEHL ET AL., supra note 78, at 8. This study extrapolated from several sources:
court records from three counties; a survey of judges, both active and retired; and infor-
mation about JAMS (it is significant to note, however, that JAMS did not take part in
this study or contribute information). Id. at 8-9. The study based its conclusion on 134
cases it identified as "thought to be privately judged," id. at 6, and on survey responses
from 151 private judges. The researchers do not state what criteria they used in deter-
mining which cases were "thought to be privately judged." See id. The information about
JAMS cited in this study consists of a single reference to an article published April 23,
1991, in the Orange County Register. This article quotes JAMS Chief Judicial Officer
John Trotter as saying that only about 50 of the 10,000 cases JAMS heard from April
1990 to March 1991 were full-blown trials. Id. at 9.
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rent-a-judges today does not mean that few will use them in twen-
ty years. Moreover, the low number of rent-a-judge proceedings
does not indicate that rent-a-judges are unpopular; it could mean
instead that rent-a-judges are inaccessible to the average litigant.
Furthermore, the primary concern should not be the number of
cases diverted from the public system but the types of issues that
rent-a-judges decide. A single case could have far-ranging public
effects.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE RENT-A-JUDGE
SYSTEM UNDER CALIFORNIA LAW
Previous attacks on the rent-a-judge system have primarily
focused on its constitutionality under the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Federal Constitution."° Defenders of
the system have found neither attack convincing," 1 and in truth,
neither argument appears persuasive, given the current state of
federal constitutional law. 2 The California state constitution,
however, may provide a more effective weapon in an attack on
private judging. 3 The liberal view of California courts toward
court access and equal protection support a cogent argument that
the rent-a-judge system is unconstitutional under state law."°
100. Note, The California Rent-a-Judge Experiment: Constitutional and Policy Consider-
ations of Pay-As-You-Go Courts, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1592 (1981).
101. See, e.g., Christensen, supra note 24, at 90-93; Stephen K. Haynes, Comment,
Private Means to Public Ends: Implications of the Private Judging Phenomenon in Cali-
fornia, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 611, 622-35 (1984); Newton & Swenson, supra note 10, at
816-19; Shapiro, supra note 10, at 293-305.
102. The equal protection argument would likely fail under federal constitutional law
because of the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. 1, 23-28 (1973), that wealth is not a "suspect class." Thus, one cannot
argue that the rent-a-judge system violates equal protection by discriminating against
those who are not wealthy enough to be able to afford rent-a-judge services. As to the
due process argument, see infra note 109 and accompanying text.
103. State constitutions often provide more expansive rights than does the Federal
Constitution. For one perspective on this issue, see Martha I. Morgan, Fundamental State
Rights: A New Basis for Strict Scrutiny in Federal Equal Protection Review, 17 GA. L.
REV. 77 (1982).
104. A preliminary issue is whether the California Constitution itself precludes an
attack on state constitutional grounds because it specifically authorizes the use of tempo-
rary judges. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 21. (Referees, however, are authorized by statute,
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 638-645 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994), and are thus not immune
from a state constitutional attack.) Although the California Constitution authorizes the
appointment of temporary judges, it does not specifically authorize the appointment of
privately paid temporary judges. Article VI is silent on the issue of payment. Until re-
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This Part argues primarily that the rent-a-judge system violates
equal protection under California law. 5 It also outlines a possi-
ble due process attack, although that argument is likely to fail
because it calls on the courts to take what could be an overly
expansive view of the state-guaranteed right of "timely access" to
the courts.106
A. Due Process Under the California Constitution
The right of access to the courts is significantly broader under
California law than under the Federal Constitution. In Earls v.
Superior Court,°7 the California Supreme Court held that "[i]n-
digents are entitled not merely to access to the courts but to time-
ly access." ' The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has held that
due process requires only that a state "afford to all individuals a
meaningful opportunity to be heard."'0 9 Thus, to attack the rent-
cently, all temporary judges have been paid by the state, id., and their primary use has
been to help clear backlogs in the public courts. Facially-and as historically ap-
plied-article VI does not conflict with the due process and equal protection clauses of
the California Constitution. An argument that article VI is meant to limit due process
and equal protection guarantees is thus not compelling.
105. California's due process and equal protection clauses are found in article I, § 7
of the state constitution. In pertinent part, this section provides that "[a] person may not
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law or denied equal pro-
tection of the laws .... " CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a).
106. If a court were to find the rent-a-judge system unconstitutional, it could grant
one of two remedies: abolishing the rent-a-judge system or requiring the state to pay
rent-a-judge fees for indigent litigants. On balance, the first option is preferable. Abolish-
ing the rent-a-judge system would mean that everyone, rich or poor, would suffer long
delays in the public courts, possibly creating more incentive for reform. If the state were
to pay the rent-a-judge fees of indigent litigants, however, the result would be less money
for the public courts and less incentive for reform.
107. 490 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1971).
108. Id. at 818 (emphasis added). Subsequent decisions of the California Supreme
Court have reiterated the entitlement to timely access. See, e.g., Payne v. Superior Court,
553 P.2d 565, 576 (Cal. 1976); March v. Municipal Court, 498 P.2d 437, 441 (Cal. 1972);
In re Marriage of Reese, 140 Cal. Rptr. 589, 591 (Ct. App. 1977).
109. Boddie v. Connecticut. 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971). Moreover, the Court has held
that indigents do not have a fundamental right of access to the courts. In Boddie, the
Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional a $60 filing fee for persons wanting a di-
vorce. At the same time, however, the Court refused to hold that "access for all individ-
uals to the courts is a right that is, in all circumstances, guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. ... Id. at 382. Two years later, in Ortwein v.
Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 661 (1973), and United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 450 (1973),
the Court upheld filing fees for civil appeals and bankruptcies. In these cases, the Court
held that access to the courts depends on the nature of the right at stake.
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a-judge system under federal law, one must argue that the public
courts are so slow and meaningless that they do not provide a
"meaningful opportunity to be heard" and that no one except a
rent-a-judge can provide adequate due process." Such an argu-
ment is obviously unworkable because it challenges the validity of
the entire state court system."'
California law, however, may support a more plausible due
process argument against rent-a-judges, although not a compelling
one. As stated before, California law guarantees not only access to
the courts but "timely access." Inability to afford a rent-a-
judge-and the speedy judgment that comes with him-arguably
could be an unconstitutional denial of timely access, especially in
cases where time is of the essence.' Few California cases, how-
ever, have interpreted the right to timely access, and it is unclear
how broad this entitlement is.
The California Supreme Court has defined the entitlement
rather narrowly."3 In Earls v. Superior Court, the court reversed
a lower court decision denying the plaintiff's application to file in
forma pauperis.114 In rejecting a request for a fee waiver, the
lower court had told the plaintiff to save up money and file suit
later." '5 The California Supreme Court held that the lower court
had denied the plaintiff her right to "timely access.",116 Courts
cannot refuse to waive filing fees, the court held, just because an
indigent litigant "may, over a period of months, succeed in accu-
mulating the amount necessary to defray his costs.""' 7 In the
context of this case, timely access meant only that an indigent lit-
110. Note, supra note 100, at 1607.
111. Id. at 1607 n.85.
112. In Los Angeles, civil cases can take up to five years to get to trial. REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 77, at 13. Delay is admittedly often to the advan-
tage of one party. However, there are also many situations in which both sides would
prefer a speedy resolution of the dispute. Arbitration is an option, but both sides must
give up any right of appeal. Rent-a-judge proceedings provide the best of both worlds-a
speedy judgment and a right of appeal.
113. See Earls v. Superior Court, 490 P.2d 814, 818-19 (Cal. 1971). Since Earls, the
California Supreme Court has not further interpreted the right to timely access.
114. Id. at 814.
115. Id. at 818.
116. Id.
117. Id. The court in March v. Municipal Court, 498 P.2d 437, 441 (Cal. 1972), fol-
lowed Earls and held that an indigent litigant cannot be denied a transcript just because
she can buy one later with future earnings.
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igant should not endure "unreasonable delays"'18 in the initial fil-
ing of his suit.
In a later case, In re Marriage of Reese,"9 however, the Cal-
ifornia Court of Appeal broadened the right of timely access to
include a right to timely judgment.2 ' This case held that a court
cannot withhold final judgment until an indigent litigant pays
costs.'2' The court held that the right to timely access is "not
limited to prepayment of filing fees but includes proceeding to
final judgment."'" Because this case was not appealed, it is un-
clear whether the California Supreme Court would agree with this
broader interpretation."2 If the right of timely access means only
a right to "timely filing," lack of access to a rent-a-judge is not a
violation of due process under California law. Inability to afford a
rent-a-judge does not prevent indigent litigants from filing suit.
However, if the right of timely access also means a right to timely
judgment, a liberal court could hold denial of access to a rent-a-
judge to be unconstitutional. An inability to afford the services of
a rent-a-judge could mean that an indigent litigant must wait years
for a judgment that could otherwise be available in a matter of
months.
Such a holding is admittedly unlikely. Even broadly interpret-
ed, a right to timely judgment does not necessarily mean a right to
the fastest possible judgment; it may mean only that indigent liti-
gants should not face undue obstacles in obtaining a final judg-
ment. Moreover, a rent-a-judge can be viewed as a privilege-a
"deluxe" feature of the court system to which the minimal guaran-
tees of due process do not apply. If due process does not entitle
indigent civil litigants to appointed counsel 2 ' or free tran-
118. Earls, 490 P.2d at 818.
119. 140 Cal. Rptr. 589 (Ct. App. 1977).
120. The plaintiff had initially been allowed to proceed in forma pauperis, but the
trial court later changed its mind and ordered the plaintiff to pay filing fees. Id. at 591.
Although the court had already granted the plaintiff a divorce, it refused to enter final
judgment until the plaintiff paid his fees. Id.
121. Id. at 592.
122. Id.
123. Although the California Supreme Court has heard several cases on the right of
access to the courts, see, e.g., Payne v. Superior Court, 553 P.2d 565 (Cal. 1976), the
court has not interpreted the right of "timely access" since Earls. The California Court of
Appeal, however, followed Reese in In re Marriage of Sanabia, 157 Cal. Rptr. 56 (Ct.
App. 1979). As in Reese, the court held that entry of final judgment cannot be condi-
tioned upon the payment of filing fees. Id. at 57.
124. Nick v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 305, 309-10 (Ct. App.
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scripts, 5 it likely does not entitle them to the luxury of a rented
judge.126
B. Equal Protection Under California Law
A more compelling argument against the rent-a-judge system
is that it violates equal protection under California law. By deny-
ing poorer litigants access to rent-a-judges, the state denies equal
access to a state-sponsored benefit. Several prior commentators
have contended that the rent-a-judge system violates equal protec-
tion under federal law, 7 but this argument has foundered on
the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court has never held wealth alone
to be a suspect classification. 28 In California, however, the state
supreme court has taken a more expansive view and held that
wealth alone can be a suspect classification. In California courts, as
in the federal courts, strict scrutiny applies to an allegedly discrimi-
natory statute if it affects a "fundamental interest" or involves a
"suspect" class. 29  In Serrano v. Priest,'30  the state supreme
court expanded the category of these suspect classifications to
include wealth distinctions. In this case, the court invalidated the
state's school financing scheme because of the overwhelming dis-
parities among districts in the amount of per-pupil revenue.'
The court held that this inequality unconstitutionally discriminated
1993) (holding that indigent is not entitled to appointed counsel in civil suits or adminis-
trative hearings).
125. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Superior Court, 133 Cal. Rptr. 825, 827 (Ct. App. 1976)
(holding that indigent seeking review of administrative hearing is not entitled to a free
transcript); Leslie v. Roe, 116 Cal. Rptr. 386, 388 (Ct. App. 1974) (holding that free
transcripts are unavailable to indigent civil plaintiffs who wish to appeal).
126. An even more tenuous due process argument against rent-a-judge proceedings
would be that the state, by creating rent-a-judges, has also created a due process
property interest in a speedy judgment. By creating the rent-a-Judge system, California
has given litigants the right to get judgments today instead of several years from now.
This right, however, is not accessible to everyone. See Note, supra note 100, at 1602, for
a similar argument that the rent-a-judge system deprives litigants of a property interest
by diminishing the value of their interests in their suits (as opposed to the argument pro-
posed here that the system creates a separate property right to a speedy judgment).
127. See, e.g., id. at 1601; Robert Gnaizda, Secret Justice for the Privileged Few, JUDI-
CATURE, June-July 1982, at 6, 11.
128. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 321-26 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S.
464, 471 (1977); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973);
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
129. See, e.g., In re Antazo, 473 P.2d 999, 1005 (Cal. 1970).
130. 487 P.2d 1241, 1252 (Cal. 1971).
131. Id. at 1251.
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against students living in less affluent districts.'32 Significantly,
the court held that such discrimination need not be intended to be
unlawful.'33 De facto, as well as de jure, discrimination is uncon-
stitutional.' Since Serrano, the California state courts have con-
tinued to hold that wealth is a suspect classification demanding
strict scrutiny."'
Despite this general rule, California courts have been some-
what reluctant to find impermissible classifications based on
wealth.136 This conservative view of wealth classifications is un-
derstandable in that an overly broad view would lead to the invali-
dation of any statute that has the indirect effect of imposing a
greater burden on poor people than on wealthy ones. Taken to an
extreme, such reasoning could imply that anything from auto regis-
tration fees to taxes137 could be challenged on equal protection
grounds. In light of this reluctance, it may not be immediately
obvious that the California courts would be willing to strike down
the rent-a-judge system as a violation of equal protection. An
analysis of the caselaw, however, demonstrates that such a chal-
lenge could be successful.
In general, California courts have found that an impermissible
wealth classification exists when a person's lack of wealth denies
him equal access to an important state-sponsored right. In Serrano
132. Id. at 1255.
133. Id. at 1253-54.
134. Quoting Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 497 (D.D.C. 1967), the court said
that "the arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness can be as disastrous and unfair to private
rights and the public interest as the perversity of a willful scheme." Serrano, 487 P.2d at
1254 n.18.
135. See, e.g., Charles S. v. Superior Court, 653 P.2d 648, 654 (Cal. 1982); Swoap v.
Superior Court, 516 P.2d 840, 850 (Cal. 1973); In re Antazo, 473 P.2d 999, 1006 (Cal.
1970); Vehicular Resident Ass'n v. Agnos, 272 Cal. Rptr. 216, 219 (Ct. App. 1990); Mill-
er v. Murphy, 191 Cal. Rptr. 740, 748 (Ct. App. 1983); Inmates of Sybil Brand Inst. for
Women v. County of Los Angeles, 181 Cal. Rptr. 599, 603-04 (Ct. App. 1982).
136. See, e.g., Swoap, 516 P.2d at 840 (upholding a statute requiring adult children to
reimburse the state for welfare payments to their parents, even though this requirement
put a bigger burden on indigents); Wood v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 481 P.2d 823 (Cal.
1971) (upholding the utility commission's credit rules that required customers to pay a
deposit if they could not establish good credit), appeal dismissed. 404 U.S. 931 (1971);
County of Los Angeles v. Patrick, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 665 (Ct. App. 1992) (upholding a
statute that denies discretionary reductions in child support payments if the child is living
with a parent on welfare).
137. This is not to say, of course, that an extremely regressive tax could not quite
possibly be challenged successfully on equal protection grounds.
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v. Priest,'38 the California Supreme Court held that the quality of
a child's public school education cannot depend on his family's
wealth.'39 This was also the case in Hartzell v. Connell,140 in
which the California Supreme Court held that schools cannot
charge activity fees for children who want to participate in extra-
curricular arts or sports programs.' 41 However, the California
state courts have refused to find wealth-based discrimination if a
statute merely affects larger numbers of poor people than wealthy
ones. For example, in Miller v. Murphy,42 the court of appeal
rejected a challenge to a municipal regulation that requires pawn-
shop owners to ask their customers for fingerprints and identifica-
tion. Even though poor people are more likely than the wealthy to
visit pawnshops, the court held that the regulation does not dis-
criminate against the poor." Instead, it distinguishes between
those who visit pawnshops and those who do not."44 Similarly, in
Vehicular Residents Association v. Agnos,145 the court of appeal
upheld an ordinance banning people living in motor homes from
parking in certain public areas at night. The court held that the
ordinance does not discriminate against the poor because wealthy
people also use motor homes and the ordinance applies equally to
them.46
In sum, the cases discussed imply that California courts will
find impermissible wealth-based discrimination if (1) the lack of
wealth results in the denial of an important state-sponsored bene-
fite47 or (2) the challenged statute or practice discriminates di-
138. 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971).
139. Id. at 1244. ("[The funding system] invidiously discriminates against the poor
because it makes the quality of a child's education a function of the wealth of his par-
ents and neighbors.").
140. 679 P.2d 35 (Cal. 1984).
141. Id. at 44. But see Arcadia Unified Sch. Dist. v. State Dep't of Educ., 825 P.2d
438 (Cal. 1992), in which the court upheld a statute authorizing school districts to charge
students fees for bus transportation. What saved that statute, however, was a provision
exempting poor students from the fees. Id. at 447-48.
142. 191 Cal. Rptr. 740 (Ct. App. 1983).
143. Id. at 748.
144. Id. Moreover, the court said, pawnshop customers are not universally poor. Id.
145. 272 Cal. Rptr. 216 (Ct. App. 1990).
146. Id. at 219. In another case based on the same rationale, the court of appeal
upheld a state statute allowing creditors to garnish debtor's wages for debts incurred "for
the 'common necessaries of life' . . . ." Thayer v. Madigan, 125 Cal. Rptr. 28, 29 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1975). The court held that the statute disadvantaged not the poor but an "inde-
terminate, and doubtless varying, class of persons who use their earnings to pay for the
necessaries of life . . . ." Id. at 30.
147. Hartzell v. Connell, 679 P.2d 35 (Cal. 1984); Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241
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rectly and solely against the poor.' 8 The rent-a-judge system fits
both of these criteria. Rent-a-judges are available only to those
who can afford them, and moreover, lack of access to a rent-a-
judge deprives poorer litigants of an important state-sponsored
benefit-that is, the rent-a-judge himself.49
Some may argue, however, that the rent-a-judge system does
not violate equal protection because it is, in fact, a luxury and not
an important state-sponsored benefit.15 As one rent-a-judge de-
fender put it,
It may be true that only the rich can afford private judging. But
it is also true that only the rich can afford private schooling,
private hospitals, better lawyers and bigger houses. There is noth-
ing unconstitutional about the fact that the rich have advantages
in this country .... As long as the wealthy do not unconstitu-
tionally deprive the poor of protected liberty rights, this access to
superior facilities is constitutionally acceptable."'
If this conception is accurate, rent-a-judge proceedings argu-
ably would be constitutional under California law. Poorer litigants
are not entitled to all the frills that wealthier litigants enjoy. 5 '
(Cal. 1971).
148. Vehicular Residents Ass'n, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 216; Miller v. Murphy, 191 Cal. Rptr.
740 (Ct. App. 1983); Thayer, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 28.
149. Or more accurately, denial of access to a rent-a-judge denies litigants the benefit
of a speedy, convenient, efficient, and private state court trial.
150. This argument was discussed supra text accompanying notes 124-26, in connection
with the due process argument against the rent-a-judge system. Although the argument
may be persuasive in that context, it fails in this one. Even though due process may not
require access to a rent-a-judge, equal protection requires evenhanded distribution of
state-conferred benefits.
151. Shapiro, supra note 10, at 313-14.
152. Indigent civil litigants are entitled to an absolute waiver of filing fees and other
costs. Nick v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 305, 310 (Ct. App.) (hold-
ing that indigent may petition for waiver of $150 witness fee required to compel state
trooper to attend license-suspension hearing), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 397 (1993); see su-
pra notes 113-17 and accompanying text. They are not, however, necessarily entitled to
free transcripts, free interpreters, or appointed counsel. Jara v. Municipal Court, 578 P.2d
94, 96 (Cal. 1978) (holding that litigant was not entitled to a free interpreter), cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 1067 (1979); Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Superior Court, 133 Cal. Rptr. 825,
827 (Ct. App. 1976) (holding that indigent seeking review of administrative hearing is not
entitled to a free transcript); Leslie v. Roe, 116 Cal. Rptr. 386, 387 (Ct. App. 1974)
(holding that free transcripts are unavailable to indigent civil plaintiffs who wish to ap-
peal). In Jara, however, the litigant was represented by counsel, who did know English
and presumably understood the proceedings. If the litigant had been unrepresented, he
would have been entitled to a free interpreter. Nick, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 309 (noting that
indigent is not entitled to appointed counsel in civil suits or administrative hearings).
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Rent-a-judges, however, are not mere frills,'53 and litigants
who use rent-a-judges are not opting out of the public system the
way private school students have opted out of the public schools.
Rent-a-judges are an inextricable part of the official state judicial
system. They are statutorily authorized, and their judgments are
honored as any other state court judgment would be. 54 Unlike
the decisions of private arbitrators, rent-a-judge judgments can be
appealed on the merits and cited as precedent. 5 Moreover, rent-
a-judges enjoy many of the same powers that sitting judges do, in-
cluding the power to call juries15 6 and to hold parties in con-
tempt.'57 In addition, unlike private arbitrators and mediators,
rent-a-judges have access to publicly funded resources. Rent-a-
judges may call their juries from the county jury pool and have
been allowed to hold proceedings in public courthouses.'58 In
sum, rent-a-judges are very much a part of the state judicial sys-
tem,15 9 but a part to which only a few have access.' 60 Analo-
gously, suppose that all children must attend a single school run
by the state. The school is free, but students have the option of
paying $10,000 a year for a Harvard-educated teacher, brand-new
textbooks (which the regular students will get next year), and a
larger variety of classes. In addition, the students get a private
lunchroom with gourmet food. Next door, the regular students
must make do with overcrowded classrooms, outdated books and
153. Even if the use of rent-a-judges were a frill, equal protection might still apply.
Commentators have pointed out that the U.S. Supreme Court "has repeatedly held states
to a standard of evenhandedness in cases in which a state monopolizes the distribution of
a good." Note, supra note 100, at 1604. The Note cited examples such as federal civil
service employment, Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976); food stamps, Unit-
ed States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); tuition at a state university,
Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); ballot access, Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134
(1972); drivers' licenses, Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); and voting, Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
154. See supra notes 13-24 and accompanying text.
155. Id.; see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 645 (West Supp. 1994).
156. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
159. This is also the crucial difference between rent-a-judges, who are state-sponsored,
and arbitrators and mediators, who are wholly private.
160. In contrast, access to the courts was not an issue in the cases involving tran-
scripts and appointed counsel. It was a given that the litigants were to have their day in
court, though the lack of counsel and other benefits might handicap their case. A litigant
who lacks access to a rent-a-judge, on the other hand, lacks all access to a benefit
available to wealthier litigants-a trial on demand.
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broken lab equipment. Only the most hard-hearted would find
such state-sponsored discrimination to be permissible. Yet the rent-
a-judge system is little different. The state provides convenient,
fast-track justice only to those who can pay for it. The rent-a-
judge system undeniably and unconstitutionally favors the wealthy.
Although wealth discrimination is suspect in California, a
statute found to discriminate on that basis may still survive if it
passes strict scrutiny. t6' But absent a compelling state interest for
which the use of rent-a-judges is necessary, the rent-a-judge system
must be held unconstitutional. The only state interest rent-a-judges
can help promote is the interest in easing the congestion in the
courts. Even if such an interest is compelling, rent-a-judges are
hardly necessary to achieve it. First of all, not enough people use
rent-a-judges to make much of a dent in the backlog."tr In fiscal
1991-1992, there were 703,791 civil cases filed in the California
courts.1 63 Rent-a-judge proceedings would have to number in the
thousands for the public courts to feel less crowded. Moreover,
nondiscriminatory means are available for easing court con-
gestion." In fact, equal protection demands that the California
legislature choose a nondiscriminatory option from the myriad
options available.
III. RENT-A-JUDGES AND PUBLIC POLICY
In some ways, the rent-a-judge system seems to be an ideal
hybrid of public and private justice. It offers the speed, efficiency,
and convenience of arbitration and mediation along with an en-
forceable, appealable state court judgment. Although individual
litigants have undoubtedly benefitted from rent-a-judges, the public
interest has not. Unanswered are many troubling questions about
the permissible scope of a rent-a-judge's authority and the role
rent-a-judges should play in the state judicial system. Also trou-
bling are the effects that rent-a-judges have on the public courts
and their potential for eroding the courts' authority. Ultimately, as
this Part argues, the rent-a-judge system puts too much public
power into private hands.
161. Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1259 (Cal. 1971).
162. See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
163. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, supra note 97, at 13-26 (totaling all petitions
filed in the California superior courts).
164. For example, courts can limit the length of trials or hire more judges.
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A. Rent-a-Judges and the Authority of the Courts
The primary purpose of a judicial system, whether public or
private, is to settle disputes. 6 The byproduct of that function is
rulemaking. 66 In private justice, rulemaking is of little concern;
litigants pay arbitrators and mediators to resolve only the dispute
at hand. Moreover, citizens do not look to arbitrators and media-
tors to formulate rules for society.167 In the public courts, howev-
er, rulemaking takes on far greater importance. Public courts play
a pivotal role in society: "Their job is not to maximize the ends of
private parties, nor simply to secure the peace, but to explicate
and give force to the values embodied in authoritative texts such
as the Constitution and statutes: to interpret those values and to
bring reality into accord with them.' ' 6' The public courts, when
they speak, speak not only for the government but for society 69
Thus, their decisions carry far greater social weight than the deci-
sions of private tribunals.7
The rent-a-judge system, however, blurs and devalues this
distinction between public and private tribunals. Although they are
nominally members of the state judiciary, rent-a-judges are chosen
by the litigants, and they offer individualized,' private justice,
much like arbitrators and mediators. Consequently, their decisions
carry less force and legitimacy in the eyes of the public than those
of wholly public courts. Much of the power of the public courts to
speak for society comes from their public accountability:
Adjudication uses public resources, and employs not strangers
chosen by the parties but public officials chosen by a process in
which the public participates. These officials, like members of the
legislative and executive branches, possess a power that has been
defined and conferred by public law, not by private agree-
ment.'72
165. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J.
LEGAL STUD. 235, 236 (1979).
166. Id.
167. See id. at 240.
168. Owen Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L. 1073, 1085 (1984).
169. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Paul D. Scott, The Public Nature of Private Adjudica.
tion, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 42, 57 (1988).
170. Id.
171. Everything is within the litigants' control, such as the time, place, and rules for
trial and the identity of the judge. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
172. Fiss, supra note 168, at 1085.
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Rent-a-judges, however, are chosen by private agreement, and the
market is the only external check upon their behavior. The system
itself imposes no quality control over the judges; consent of the lit-
igants is the only requirement for the appointment of a rent-a-
judge. 73 California's general reference statutes state no qualifica-
tions that rent-a-judges must meet.74 Unlike their public court
counterparts, rent-a-judges do not pass through the screening pro-
cess of public election or governmental appointment. Moreover,
there is no disciplining body for rent-a-judges, 75 and unlike oth-
er public court judges, rent-a-judges apparently cannot be im-
peached or recalled. Thus, despite their public role, rent-a-judges
are not publicly accountable. Although rent-a-judges nominally
enjoy the authority of the state, this authority is undermined by
the lack of a public mandate. Because rent-a-judges do not have
the same institutional backing as their public court brethren, their
judgments lack the public weight and authority of other state court
rulings.
176
The element of choice also diminishes the authority of rent-a-
judge judgments. The rent-a-judge system creates a buyer's market
that the litigants control, and the judges must tailor their reputa-
tions and their decisionmaking to attract customers. As noted
above, some California rent-a-judges have even toned down their
personalities to make themselves more marketable. 177 The rent-a-
judge system upends the usual balance of power between judges
and litigants.78 Moreover, the power of choice vested in litigants
diminishes the threat of state authority, which is a chief source of
power for the courts: "Among other things, government sanction
173. See supra notes 13, 19 and accompanying text. Again, some may argue that the
free market imposes the best quality control of all.
174. Id
175. See Gnaizda, supra note 127, at 12; Thomas S. Vangel, Private Judging in Cali-
fornia: Ethical Concerns and Constitutional Considerations, 23 NEw ENG. L. REv. 363,
376 (1988).
176. This argument, though possibly applicable, is not directed at wholly private meth-
ods of dispute resolution, such as binding arbitration. Private arbitrators and mediators do
not pretend to assume the mantle of the state in issuing their judgments, and their deci-
sions are not given the same weight as rent-a-judge judgments because they cannot be
appealed on the merits or treated as precedent. Legitimacy in the eyes of the public is
not a concern for private arbitrators, nor is it intended to be.
177. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
178. This result is especially peculiar because litigants, by filing suit, call on the au-
thority of the state to hear their case.
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implies the direct threat of compulsion by the state [and gives
judgments] a degree of clarity and forcefulness." '179 The ability to
choose a judge, however, enables litigants to shape the ultimate
judgment. And where the ultimate goal is customer satisfaction,
rent-a-judges are also likely to de-emphasize their coercive powers
as agents of the state. Thus by empowering litigants, the rent-a-
judge system weakens the judiciary.180
B. Rent-a-judges and the Rule of Law
As noted above, rulemaking is a crucial function of the public
courts. It is a function, however, that rent-a-judges cannot ade-
quately perform. A rent-a-judge's public-private split personality is
again the source of problems. As members of the public court sys-
tem, rent-a-judges would best serve society by pronouncing broad
rules of wide applicability. As privately hired dispute resolution
experts, however, rent-a-judges are more likely to decide cases on
very narrow grounds. As Judge Posner and Professor Landes note,
[A] system of voluntary adjudication [such as rent-a-judge] is
strongly biased against the creation of precise rules of any sort.
Any rule that clearly indicates how a judge is likely to decide a
case will assure that no disputes subject to the rule are submitted
to that judge since one party will know that it will lose. Judges
will tend to promulgate vague standards which give each party to
a dispute a fighting chance. 8'
Thus, when shopping for a judge, litigants look for someone who
is likely both to rule in their favor and to meet the approval of
the opposing party. The ultimate choice will be a judge with a
reputation for being impartial, though "impartial" is more likely to
mean "accomodating." Rent-a-judges must avoid creating a coher-
ent set of precedents; predictability could destroy a rent-a-judge's
appeal to potential customers. In fact, the market provides great
incentive for rent-a-judges to be deliberately inconsistent in their
179. Hazard & Scott, supra note 169, at 57.
180. In other words, the litigants, not the judges, "call the shots." They choose the
rules and the forum. They rent judges and pay them for their services. Admittedly, this
argument is based somewhat on moral indignation at the idea of judges acting less than
judgelike and compromising for profit their authority and inherent power as judges. Per-
haps, in an economy as service-driven and product-oriented as ours, the idea of state
judgments for sale is not so shocking. But then again, perhaps it should be.
181. Landes & Posner, supra note 165, at 239-40.
[Vol. 44:166
RENT-A-JUDGES
rulings. This behavior by rent-a-judges is destructive in several
ways. The body of law thus created is nothing more than a confus-
ing tangle of narrow and contradictory rules, many of which have
little relevance to anyone beyond the immediate litigants.'12 Even
if the rules formulated by rent-a-judges are broad enough to be
useful to society at large, they are not always likely to reflect the
interests of the public. After all, the public is not a paying custom-
er.
183
C. Private Judges and the Public Interest
A rent-a-judge's dual, public-private nature also raises ques-
tions about the permissible depth and breadth of a rent-a-judge's
decisionmaking authority. Rent-a-judges are chosen by private
parties and are not accountable to the public. It is therefore trou-
bling that they should have the authority to impose their rulings
upon the whole of society. Rent-a-judges could conceivably address
issues involving important civil liberties, such as gun control,
school prayer, or abortion."l California statutes allow rent-a-
judges to hear any dispute if the parties consent. 5 Moreover,
rent-a-judge judgments are treated exactly the same as other state
court judgments and thus presumably have the same effects of
collateral estoppel and res judicata.'8 6
The public interest, however, demands limits on the reach of
rent-a-judge rulings. There are two possible approaches to deter-
mining the types of cases suitable for rent-a-judge resolution. One
approach would be to categorize cases according to the type of
182. The same argument can be made against binding arbitration. Arbitration, howev-
er, is not similarly objectionable because it is a wholly private process. An arbitral award
has no impact on the public at large, except tangentially, nor does it affect the body of
public law by creating precedent. Rent-a-judge judgments, however, are identical in every
respect to public state court judgments. They can be appealed on the merits, and they
can be cited. See supra text accompanying notes 30-32. Rent-a-judge judgments, especially
if appealed, can thus shape the law and may even have tremendous influence.
183. The same is true of binding arbitration, but again, the product of arbitration is
wholly private. The public at large has no interest in arbitral awards because the public
does not participate in the process, and arbitral awards create no precedent.
184. Although it is unlikely that the plaintiffs in a case of major constitutional sig-
nificance would consent to a rent-a-judge, it is not impossible. Moreover, rent-a-judges
are already deciding issues of public importance. As mentioned above, rent-a-judges have
handled at least two cases involving California state agencies. See supra notes 62-64 and
accompanying text.
185. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 638 (West 1993).
186. Id. § 644 (West Supp. 1994).
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issue at stake; under this approach, disputes over "public law" or
"public values," for example, should be reserved for the public
courts.'87 Such cases would include not only those involving con-
stitutional questions or government regulation,"8 but also those
addressing "issues of great public concern,"' 89 such as the de-
velopment of legal standards in products liability cases.9 Be-
cause consent of the litigants is a fundamental element of the rent-
a-judge system, the second approach would focus on the number
of people uninvolved in the suit who are likely to be affected by a
rent-a-judge judgment. Thus, rent-a-judges would be less suited to
render judgments that would otherwise have broad preclusive
effects on other potential litigants.19t Mass tort cases would be
an example."9 The two approaches would overlap in some areas;
a suit to enjoin discriminatory practices at a factory, for example,
would both involve constitutional issues and affect a large number
of people uninvolved in the suit. Under either of the preceding ap-
proaches, the following types of cases would be particularly suit-
able for resolution by a rent-a-judge: 1'93
187. Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resohtion: Panacea or Anathema?, 99
HARV. L. REV. 668, 676 (1986).
188. Id. at 671.
189. Id. Arguably, the process of out-of-court settlement also takes "issues of great
public concern" away from the courts, and some have argued that this too is undesirable.
See Fiss, supra note 168, at 1085. Settlement negotiations are, however, completely di-
vorced from the official judicial process; rent-a-judging is not. When negotiating for a
settlement, lawyers talk dollars more than legal standards, and even if they do discuss le-
gal standards, their discussions have no binding effect on the public at large. Rent-a-
judge judgments, on the other hand, have the full force of state court authority. See
supra note 31.
190. Edwards, supra note 187, at 671.
191. An alternate view that combines these two approaches looks to the
"externalities" a case produces, that is, "the effects a transaction or dispute . . .has on
those other than the parties themselves." Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Study on Paths to a
"Better Way". Litigation, Alternatives and Accommodation, 1989 DUKE L.J. 824, 868.
Cases are less suitable for private resolution if they involve externalities of major con-
cern, such as the development of legal doctrines or the enforcement of important policies.
Id.
192. Suppose, for example, that a plane crashes and kills all 300 passengers on board.
Suppose, also, that a rent-a-judge resolves the first lawsuit to arise from this accident and
holds that the airline was not negligent. The question is whether this judgment should
have broad issue-preclusive effect if the survivors of the other 299 passengers were to
sue in the same jurisdiction. In light of the concerns discussed above, the answer would
seem to be no.
193. This list is by no means exhaustive. Labor disputes, for example, could be well
suited for rent-a-judge resolution.
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* Family disputes-Divorces are especially suitable rent-
a-judge cases. Few parties are involved, and the is-
sues at stake are very rarely of public significance.
• Torts-Garden-variety, single-plaintiff cases that re-
quire only the application of existing standards are
most appropriate for rent-a-judges to hear. 94 In
these cases, the rent-a-judge's function would be
mostly factfinding. As discussed above, however, mass
tort and products liability cases may be less suited
for rent-a-judge courts.
• Complex commercial litigation-Although large sums
of money are usually at stake, these cases also in-
volve few interests, and the issues are rarely of signif-
icant public importance. Rent-a-judges may even be
better suited than public court judges to hear these
cases if they have expertise in a particular area.
A number of other types of cases, however, are inappropriate
for resolution by rent-a-judges. Many of these have been men-
tioned above, such as cases involving constitutional questions or
government regulation. Agency civil enforcement actions are an-
other example of cases that should stay out of rent-a-judge
courts. 1 95
Categorizing cases for rent-a-judge resolution is simple in the
abstract. But in real life, pure public law cases are harder to
spot.t96 Drafting suitable guidelines for the proper diversion of
cases to rent-a-judges would be an extremely difficult task. En-
forcement of such guidelines would be even more difficult and
could create a whole new area of time-consuming and wasteful liti-
gation. The concerns discussed above cast serious doubt on the
utility of rent-a-judges in the public court system. Essentially, the
public and private roles of a rent-a-judge cannot be reconciled.
194. Examples include run-of-the-mill negligence cases (such as slip-and-falls), defa-
mation, and trespass.
195. California rent-a-judge courts are already hearing such cases, however. See supra
notes 62-64.
196. As Professor Edwards notes, "[H]idden in many seemingly private disputes are
often difficult issues of public law." Edwards, supra note 187, at 671.
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D. Efforts at Rent-a-Judge Regulation in California
The growth of the rent-a-judge industry was largely uncon-
trolled until last year. In February 1993, the Judicial Council of
California adopted a number of new rules to regulate the practice
of private judging. The rules came after nearly four years of de-
bate, 97 and as the product of compromise, they are but a tenta-
tive first step toward true regulation of the rent-a-judge business.
These rules do nothing to address the larger policy concerns dis-
cussed above. They are instead largely cosmetic and attempt to
regulate only superficial matters. The rules made three changes:
(1) if a party before a rent-a-judge is a "repeat customer," that
fact must be disclosed to the other side; (2) rent-a-judge trials
must be open to the public; and (3) rent-a-judges may not use
public facilities or resources without the consent of the presiding
judge.198
1. The disclosure requirement. Four new provisions of
the California Rules of Court provide, in identical language, as
follows:
A privately compensated [temporary judge or referee], as soon as
practicable, shall disclose to the parties any potential ground for
disqualification ... and any facts that might reasonably cause a
party to entertain a doubt that the temporary judge would be
able to be impartial.199
Although this rule is a -good first step toward demanding the
ethical conduct of private judges, it leaves a number of concerns
unaddressed. Most troubling is the fact that no public or private
body exists to discipline rent-a-judges who fail to abide by this
rule.z"' This deficiency presents endless possibilities for conspira-
cy and fraud.
197. Dresslar, supra note 8, at A5.
198. One superior court judge has pointed out that the promulgators of these rules in-
clude many judges who have a vested interest in keeping the rent-a-judge system viable:
"[Tihe only reason that virtually all sitting judges are in favor of private judging [is be-
cause] there is a chance of earning large incomes once they leave the public system. By
supporting and working toward this . . . institutionalizing [of] private judging, they are
feathering their nest." Letter from Judge Robert H. O'Brien, of the California Superior
Court, to Andrea L. Biren, Judicial Council of California (July 17, 1992) (on file with
the Judicial Council of California) [hereinafter Letter].
199. CAL. R. Cr. 244(c), 244.1(b), 532(c), 532.1(b).
200. See Gnaizda, supra note 127, at 12; Vangel, supra note 175, at 376.
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One proposed solution is to require that rent-a-judges also
make their disclosures public.2"' Indeed, a publicly accessible
"track record" of each rent-a-judge's cases can do more to ensure
a judge's integrity than reliance on voluntary disclosures. Such a
record can also provide more information to prospective customers
who would otherwise have to rely on the rent-a-judge's discretion
to reveal possible conflicts of interest.
Practically speaking, disclosure may not necessarily have much
influence on whom parties choose to be their judge. One of the
touted advantages of the rent-a-judge system is the ability of liti-
gants to choose judges with various areas of expertise. If litigants
are looking for such an expert, their choices are probably limited.
2. The access requirement. The secrecy of rent-a-judge
proceedings has been a primary concern of prior commentators
who argued that lack of access violated the First Amendment
rights of both the media and the public."2 Under the new rules
adopted by the Judicial Council, rent-a-judge proceedings must, in
theory, be open to the public.0 3 The rules place substantial ob-
stacles, however, to full access.
Most significantly, the new rules do not make rent-a-judge
trials routinely accessible. The new rules provide that rent-a-judge
trials may "be heard at a site easily accessible to the public and
appropriate for seating those who have made known their plan to
attend hearings."2" However, such arrangements are required
only by order of the presiding judge, either on his own motion or
on request "of any person."20 5 Moreover, requests for such or-
ders "shall be by letter with reasons stated and shall be accompa-
nied by a declaration that a copy of the request was mailed to
each party, to the temporary judge, and to the clerk for placement
in the file."2" A better approach may be to presume that a rent-
a-judge trial is open to the public unless the litigants can give
strong reasons to have it closed.0 7 The current rule, with its
201. Letter, supra note 198, at 7.
202. Perry L. Glantz, Analysis of a First Amendment Challenge to Rent-a-Judge Pro-
ceedings, 14 PEPP. L. REV. 989, 1001-02 (1987); see also Christensen, supra note 24, at
93; Vangel, supra note 175, at 388; Note, supra note 100, at 1608-09.




207. Philip Carrizosa, Rent-a-Judge Rule Concerns Media Officials, Los ANGELES DAI-
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many procedural hurdles, may discourage all but the most persis-
tent from attending a rent-a-judge trial.
3. Use of public facilities. Rent-a-judges have had, until
recently, free access to public courtrooms and other facilities.
Moreover, they have had the power of summoning jurors from the
county jury pool.2" Although rent-a-judges are nominally ad-
juncts of the public courts, many people nonetheless have criticized
the public financing of what they perceive as wholly private tri-
als.' In response, the Judicial Council has attempted to limit
the use of public resources for private trials, and the new rules
prohibit the use of public court facilities and the summoning of
-jurors "except upon a finding by the presiding judge that the use
would further the interests of justice." '
The rules, however, say nothing about exactly what would
"further the interests of justice." The rubber-stamping of requests
for public services and facilities is a serious concern, especially in
light of evidence of back-scratching among public court judges and
their rent-a-judge brethren.21
These new rules not only are flawed but reveal the Judicial
Council's own discomfort and uncertainty over the public-private
nature of rent-a-judge proceedings. On the one hand, the access
and disclosure requirements seem to imply that rent-a-judges are
public officials who must be made accountable. On the other hand,
the rule denying rent-a-judges unconditional free access to public
facilities implies that rent-a-judges are wholly private figures un-
sanctioned by the state. The state's confusion over the role of
rent-a-judges in the public courts serves as a warning against their
widespread use.
LY J., July 28, 1992, at 1 (quoting Bob Rawitch, president of the California First Amend-
ment Coalition).
208. See supra notes 38-46.
209. See, e.g., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 77, at 27-29; Gnaizda,
supra note 127, at 12.
210. CAL. R. CT. 244(d), 532(d), 244.1(c), 532.1(c).
211. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, stpra note 77, at 39. The committee heard





The rent-a-judge system is an unconstitutional, elitist institu-
tion that unfairly grants privileges to the wealthy. Moreover, it is
the product of a misguided union of the public and private sectors.
In private justice, the market is the driving force, and the product
is narrow and specialized. In the public courts, broader interests
prevail, and the rulings of the public courts govern not only the
individual litigants but society at large. The rent-a-judge system is
nominally a part of the public courts, but it is essentially market-
driven. Rent-a-judging is the product of a fundamental clash in
goals and values, and as such, it cannot and should not survive as
a meaningful part of the justice system.
